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Contextualism about Belief Ascriptions 
Roger Clarke 
This chapter does two main things by way of discussing contextualism about 
belief ascriptions: on one hand, I will survey a range of different accounts of belief 
recently defended in print; on the other, I will sketch some ways of arguing for 
contextualism about belief ascriptions. Most of the accounts of belief I’ll survey do 
not entail b-contextualism,1 but instead take belief to be situation-sensitive in one or 
another way. One of the lines of argument I’ll sketch, then, aims to motivate 
b-contextualism by appeal to belief’s situation sensitivity.  
The first part of the chapter, then, is given over to a survey of situation-sensitive 
accounts of belief. §1 sets up a problem all of these views aim to solve, and §§2-5  
discuss four different types of situation-sensitivity. Few of the philosophers whose 
views are covered here explicitly consider the question of b-contextualism—that is, 
sensitivity of belief ascriptions to the ascriber’s context, rather than sensitivity of 
belief to the believer’s situation—and none of them explicitly defend 
b-contextualism.2 In §6, I supply a sketch of an argument that any of these views of 
belief as situation-sensitive gives motivation for adopting b-contextualism as well. 
The final two sections get at b-contextualism more directly. First, §7 outlines Eric 
Schwitzgebel’s phenomenal, dispositional account of belief. Unlike the views 
surveyed in in §§2-5, this is an explicitly b-contextualist account. 
Finally, I offer a belief-analogue of a familiar sort of argument for 
k-contextualism: case pairs. §8 describes a single agent whom one speaker correctly 
describes as believing and another speaker correctly describes as not believing a 
proposition p. 
1 Full and Partial Belief: A Lottery Problem 
All of the situation-sensitive accounts of belief we are about to encounter are 
motivated at least in part3 by the problem of reconciling full belief (outright belief or 
belief simpliciter) with partial belief (degree of belief or credence). It’s natural to 
                                                          
1 For convenience, I’ll use “b-contextualism” as shorthand for “contextualism about 
belief ascriptions.” I’ll also use “k-contextualism” in a similar way when it helps to 
avoid ambiguity. 
2 Well, almost none. Sturgeon (2008: 142) very briefly argues that “believes p” is a 
gradable expression and therefore context sensitive. 
3 The accounts of Weatherson (2005) and Ganson (2008) are also centrally motivated 
by debates over subject-sensitive invariantism. Both hope to, as Weatherson puts it, 
“do without” pragmatic encroachment about the normative dimension of 
knowledge: that is, both views have it that there is pragmatic encroachment on 
justified belief, but only because there is pragmatic encroachment on belief 
simpliciter. (Weatherson’s later writing on this topic no longer claims to do without 
non-doxastic pragmatic encroachment on knowledge completely, having been 
persuaded by Stanley’s Ignorant High Stakes bank case; see Weatherson 2012: 77.) 
Bach (2005), similarly, adopts a situation-sensitive view of belief in objecting to 
k-contextualism. 
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think the two notions of belief relate in a straightforward way: to fully believe 
something is to have a high enough degree of belief. That is, the following is a natural 
thought:  
      
Simple Threshold There is a threshold value r<1 such that, for any agent S, 
time t, and proposition p, S believes p at t iff, at t, S has credence in p above 
r.4  
(Note that Simple Threshold is situation-insensitive: the threshold value r applies to 
all agents and propositions, at all times.) 
The difficulty for Simple Threshold stems from the conflicting norms of 
rationality on full and partial belief. Full belief is standardly thought to be governed 
by a norm of logical coherence: one ought not to believe contradictions, and one 
ought to believe the logical consequences of one’s beliefs. Partial belief, on the other 
hand, is standardly thought to be governed by a norm of probabilistic coherence: 
one’s credences should obey the axioms of probability. 
Logic and probability give us different norms, but why think they conflict? The 
lottery problem of Kyburg (1961) gives a nice illustration. Suppose we have a fair 
lottery with n tickets—that is, exactly one ticket will win, and each ticket has an equal 
chance of winning. Where pi is the proposition that ticket i wins, we have Pr(pi) = 
1/n, for any 1≤i≤n. Rationality should, then, permit one to assign credence 1/n to each 
proposition pi. Now consider the proposition that ticket i will lose, equivalent to ¬pi. 
If our credences obey the probability axioms, we will assign this proposition a 
credence of (n-1)/n. By making the lottery large enough—that is, by increasing the 
number of tickets n—we can then bring our credence in ticket i’s losing as close to 1 
as we like. In particular, whatever the threshold r for full belief, we can set our 
credence in ticket i’s losing above r; thus, we have a full belief that ticket i will lose, 
for each i. But it is a logical consequence of these n beliefs that no ticket will win. 
Thus we have contradictory requirements: logical coherence requires us to believe no 
ticket will win, but we assign credence 1 to the proposition that exactly one ticket will 
win. Something has to give. 
Each of the views we will consider in this section avoids the lottery problem by 
postulating one or another kind of situation sensitivity. Since Simple Threshold 
postulates a single threshold value necessary and sufficient for belief for all agents, 
times, and propositions, all of these views, by virtue of their situation sensitivity, 
violate Simple Threshold. In §2, we find views on which the threshold for full belief 
varies across situations. In §3, we find views on which different situations induce 
different partitions on the space of possible worlds. Effectively, then, different 
situations make different sets of propositions relevant; the views of belief we’ll 
encounter in that section involve quantifying over a set of relevant propositions in 
                                                          
4 This threshold principle is sometimes called “the Lockean Thesis,” following Foley 
(1993: ch. 4). And, indeed, Foley does endorse the principle I call Simple Threshold 
in that chapter. However, Foley’s “Lockean Thesis” is a principle about rational 
belief and rational degrees of belief, and I prefer to follow Foley on this point: the 
Lockean Thesis, then, says that there is a threshold value s such that one is rational 
to believe p iff one is rational to have credence in p above s. Above-threshold 
credence in something one does not believe is, then, impossible according to Simple 
Threshold, but merely irrational according to the Lockean Thesis. 
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bridging full and partial belief. §4 considers views on which the bridge between full 
and partial belief quantifies over the live options available to the believer, much as 
the previous section quantified over relevant propositions. All three of these sections 
deal with views on which partial belief is situation-invariant, but the bridge principle 
between full and partial belief is situation-sensitive. In §5, on the other hand, we 
encounter views on which full belief is situation-sensitive because credences 
themselves are situation-sensitive. In each section, I will describe how the relevant 
sort of situation-sensitivity solves the lottery problem, and also discuss how such an 
account of belief might be independently motivated. After all, we hope for more than 
an ad hoc response to a very specific sort of puzzle. 
Finally, in §6, I consider generally how a view of belief as situation-sensitive in 
one of these ways may ground a case for contextualism about belief ascriptions. 
Much as I mean in the following sections to give the impression of widespread 
support for situation-sensitive views of belief, there is hardly a consensus that 
something like this is correct. See Stalnaker (1984: 80–1), Maher (1986: 383), Foley 
(1993: 199), and Kaplan (1996: 101) for denials of belief’s situation-sensitivity; and 
see Buchak (2014); Ross and Schroeder (2014) for recent arguments that belief 
cannot be reduced to credence at all, let alone in one of the situation-sensitive ways to 
be outlined in the following. 
2 Shifting Thresholds 
Notice the order of quantifiers in Simple Threshold:  
      
Simple Threshold There is a threshold value r<1 such that, for any agent S, 
time t, and proposition p, S believes p at t iff, at t, S has credence in p above r.  
In setting up the problem, we first suppose a threshold value r to have been given, 
then construct a lottery large enough to get S’s credence in losing over r: then we 
conclude that S must believe, inconsistently, that ticket 1 is a loser, that ticket 2 is a 
loser, …, that ticket n is a loser, and also that one of these tickets is not a loser. 
Let’s try modifying the threshold principle by shuffling our quantifiers:  
      
Shifty Threshold For any agent S and time t, there is a threshold value r<1 
such that, for any proposition p, S believes p at t iff, at t, S has credence in p 
above r.  
Here’s the difference. Simple Threshold has it that there is some threshold value 
dividing belief from non-belief across the board, regardless of situation, believer, or 
proposition believed; Shifty Threshold, on the other hand, says that the difference 
between belief and non-belief in any given proposition does come down to whether 
one’s credence is above or below some threshold, but agents in different situations 
can have different threshold values. 
Now, when we try to set up the lottery problem, we can’t run the usual 
construction. That is, given Shifty Threshold, we can’t count on the threshold value r 
being determined in advance of our specifying a situation—in advance of our 
specifying the size of the lottery. Perhaps a rational agent faced with a lottery of size 
n will always have a threshold for belief set so that r > (n-1)/n, so that the agent does 
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not believe that ticket i will lose, for any i. If we can avoid attributing the latter 
beliefs, we avoid attributing inconsistency. Problem solved. 
How can we motivate such a view of belief? Ganson (2008) gives one line of 
argument. If one believes that p, we can expect one to act as if p. That is, if one 
believes that p, and one thinks that the best thing to do given p is A, we expect one to 
do A. She suggests the following condition as necessary for belief that p: “believing 
that p to a degree which is high enough to ensure that one is willing to act as if p is 
true, where one’s being willing to act as if p means that what one is in fact willing to 
do is the same as what one would be willing to do, given p” (Ganson, 2008: 451). 
Similar remarks, albeit less clearly endorsed, can be found in Fantl and McGrath 
(2009: ch. 5). 
Shifting-threshold views of belief can be found in: Kyburg (1983); Bach (2005); 
Ganson (2008); Sturgeon (2008); Fantl and McGrath (2009: ch. 5); Leitgeb (2013, 
2014, forthcoming). 
3 Shifting Partitions 
Leitgeb (2013, 2014, forthcoming) invokes shifting thresholds for full belief, as 
described in the previous section, but also posits another way belief might be 
situation-sensitive: the way we partition logical space may change across situations. 
Here’s a way of understanding the idea: suppose we have a quantificational 
account of full belief in the following sense: we say that an agent believes p if, or 
only if, for all (relevant) propositions q, p bears some relation to q. Examples: the 
agent’s credence in p conditional on q is high enough, i.e., above some threshold s 
(Leitgeb); the agent’s preferences conditional on q are the same as the agent’s 
preferences conditional on the conjunction p and q (Weatherson). We can understand 
a partition of logical space as generating a set of propositions over which such a 
clause quantifies. The partition, so to speak, gives us a collection of atomic 
propositions. 
In general, on this sort of view, more coarse-grained partitions (allowing fewer 
atomic propositions) make full belief easier to come by; more fine-grained partitions 
(allowing more atomic propositions) make it harder. 
Leitgeb appeals to shifting partitions to explain the lottery case. He says that, 
when the question at hand is which ticket will win?, the appropriate partition has n 
cells, one for each ticket, containing those worlds where ticket i wins (for 1≤i≤n). On 
the other hand, when the question at hand is will my ticket win?, the appropriate 
partition has only two cells: a cell where one’s ticket wins and a cell where one’s 
ticket loses. In the latter case, but not the former, Leitgeb’s framework allows an 
ideally rational agent to believe that her ticket will lose. But in the case where our 
ideally rational agent believes her ticket will lose, the partition of logical space does 
not allow her to frame the question whether someone else’s ticket will also lose; thus 
we avoid the contradictory requirement that she believe of each ticket that it will lose. 
Lotteries aside, why accept partition-sensitivity? In a nutshell, the main benefit of 
Leitgeb’s view is that it lets us keep three apparently conflicting desiderata on a 
unified view of full and partial belief: logical norms for full belief, probabilistic 
norms for partial belief, and a threshold principle linking the two. The lottery problem 
is simply an illustration of the apparent conflict between these three desiderata—one 
application among many Leitgeb provides. 
Shifting-partition views of belief can be found in: Weatherson (2005, 2012, 
2014); Leitgeb (2013, 2014, forthcoming). 
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4 Shifting Options 
In a series of papers (Weatherson, 2005, 2012, 2014), Brian Weatherson defends a 
view of belief that  
start[s] with the functionalist idea that to believe that p is to treat p as 
true for the purposes of practical reasoning. To believe p is to have 
preferences that make sense, by your own lights, in a world where p is 
true.” (Weatherson 2005: 421) 
Here’s a concise statement of the basic idea:  
Very roughly, to believe that p is simply to have the same attitudes, 
towards all salient questions, unconditionally as you have conditional on 
p. (Weatherson 2014: 17, emphasis added) 
In particular, if one believes that p, then one prefers A to B conditional on p iff one 
prefers A to B unconditionally. The emphasized clause above gives us Weatherson’s 
situation-sensitivity:5 the question (for example) whether it would be better to accept 
or reject some bet on whether p is only salient in situations where the bet might be 
offered; in other situations, one’s attitudes towards this question make no difference 
to one’s beliefs. 
Apply this to the lottery. Plausibly, in a lottery situation, one has some options 
that one disprefers unconditionally, but would prefer conditionally on ticket i’s 
losing: for example, throw away ticket i, or sell ticket i for a minimal sum. It is 
difficult to construct a lottery scenario where one’s preferences are unchanged by 
conditionalizing on ticket i’s losing—so it is difficult to construct a lottery scenario 
where one believes ticket i will lose, by Weatherson’s lights. 
Note that Weatherson’s view as articulated here does not commit him to Shifty 
Threshold (§2). Recall, with added emphasis:  
      
Shifty Threshold For any agent S and time t, there is a threshold value r 
such that, for any proposition p, S believes p at t iff, at t, S has credence in p 
above r.  
Weatherson’s view does not entail that, even having fixed an agent and a time, there 
will be any threshold value appropriate for all propositions. Consider an agent faced 
with two options, A and B. Suppose the agent’s credences and utilities are as in the 
following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 See also §3: the less-simplified version of Weatherson’s view also involves shifting 
partitions. Simplifying less: if one believes that p, then for all active propositions q, 
one has the same attitudes conditional on q alone as one has conditional on the 
conjunction p&q. The clause emphasized here yields shifting partitions; see 
Weatherson (2005: 423) for discussion of what it is for a proposition to be “active”. 
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 p&q p&¬q ¬p&q ¬p&¬q 
Credence 90% 5% 3% 2% 
u(A) 0 0 100 0 
u(B) 0 40 0 0 
Table 1: Some credences and utilities. 
For this agent, A’s unconditional expected value (EV) is 3 units, and B’s is 2 
units, so the agent unconditionally prefers A to B. Likewise, the agent prefers A to B 
conditional on q (positive EV versus zero EV, conditional on q). But conditional on p, 
the agent prefers B to A. So on (a simplified version of) Weatherson’s view, the agent 
cannot believe p, because of her conditional and unconditional preferences with 
respect to A and B. On the other hand, her preferences with respect to A and B are 
consistent with her believing q. Therefore, for all that we’ve said about the agent’s 
preferences, she might believe q, but she cannot believe p. According to Shifty 
Threshold, though, she must believe p if she believes q, since she has a higher 
credence in p (95% versus 93%). 
The shifting-threshold views cited at the end of §2 can all be read as 
shifting-options views as well; see also Weatherson (2005, 2012, 2014); Fantl and 
McGrath (2009). 
5 Shifting Presuppositions 
Clarke (2013) takes a slightly different tack. All the above accounts take credence to 
be situation-invariant, but give a situation-sensitive bridge principle linking credence 
to full belief; Clarke instead takes credence itself to be situation-sensitive, and 
identifies full belief with credence 1. 
In fact, Clarke (2013) argues for two theses we might want to separate. These are, 
first, that belief is credence 1, and, second, that credence is situation-sensitive, with 
the believer’s situation determining a space of alternative possibilities. Clarke’s 
argument for the package of both theses as follows: (a) belief-as-credence-1 is usually 
thought to be too demanding—belief is common, credence 1 is rare—but the reasons 
for thinking so are undermined by the situation-sensitivity of credence; (b) 
belief-as-credence-1 avoids notable drawbacks of the simple threshold view; and (c) 
accepting the situation-sensitivity of credences does not undermine the usual benefits 
of credence-centric approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science. Now 
suppose we’re unconvinced by the case for (a) and/or (c). Then we might want to 
reject the identification of belief with credence 1, but we might nevertheless think that 
full belief is situation-sensitive in roughly the way he claims credence is. 
We can think of the present sort of situation-sensitivity as analogous to a relevant 
alternatives account of knowledge: to believe that p is to rule out (doxastically), or 
reject, all relevant alternatives to p. One might lose a belief that p not because one has 
changed one’s mind about whether any possibility is actual, but because more 
possibilities have become relevant or salient. This sort of shift gives us a response to 
the lottery: in a lottery situation, one is likely to take seriously—to count as 
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relevant—the possibility where one’s ticket wins; and unless one has nefarious 
friends with inside information about the lottery draw, one will have no reason to rule 
this possibility out. Thus, contrary to Simple Threshold, one will not believe that 
one’s ticket will lose, since there is a relevant counter-possibility one does not rule 
out. 
Note that the response to the lottery problem given here does not necessarily 
require any particular thesis connecting belief and credence. One can certainly tell the 
same story in terms of credences given certain such theses—Clarke identifies 
doxastic “ruling out” with assigning zero credence, so that one lacks belief in the 
lottery case because one gives positive credence to one’s ticket winning—but the 
story stands on its own terms. One might, for example, think belief cannot be reduced 
to credence at all, as Buchak (2014) and Ross and Schroeder (2014) have recently 
argued. 
What advantages, then, are there to postulating this sort of situation-sensitivity for 
full belief, setting credence aside? Greco (forthcoming) develops an anti-idealizing 
motivation for this sort of picture: we finite agents cannot, in general, deal with the 
full range of possible worlds, and so simplify our cognitive lives by selectively 
ignoring irrelevant possibilities. Greco also argues for a parallel between this 
situation-sensitive picture of belief and conversational dynamics: the way the set of 
doxastically relevant possibilities can change mirrors the way conversationally 
relevant possibilities change in response to information entering the conversational 
common ground; Clarke (manuscript) pursues a similar line of argument. 
Shifting-presupposition views of belief can be found in: Clarke (2013, 
forthcoming); Greco (forthcoming), and, arguably, Levi (1980). See also Nozick 
(1981: 96ff) for a sketch of a similar proposal. 
6 From Situation Sensitivity to Context 
Sensitivity 
We’ve now seen four kinds of situation-sensitive account. One’s situation might 
determine a threshold such that one believes only those propositions in which one has 
credence over the threshold; it might determine a partition, contributing a set of 
propositions over which some quantifier in a condition on belief ranges; it might 
determine a set of options, again governing a quantifier in a condition on belief; or it 
might determine a set of presuppositions, bounding a space of salient possibilities. 
None of the authors cited above argue explicitly for b-contextualism,6 but neither do 
they explicitly reject it. In this section, I sketch how one might motivate 
b-contextualism based on accepting a situation-sensitive account of belief. 
So suppose at least one of these accounts is correct. Then belief is situation 
sensitive, which I take to mean (for present purposes) that belief is not a binary 
                                                          
6 Leitgeb is carefully neutral on this question: he gives a formal framework for 
representing ideally rational belief featuring something like situation- or 
context-sensitivity, but he leaves it open how the framework is to be interpreted. It 
could be that what an ideal agent believes is situation-sensitive, or that what an 
agent is correctly described as (rationally) believing is context-sensitive. See 
Leitgeb (2014: 149ff) for discussion. See also footnote Error! Bookmark not 
defined.. 
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relation between agent and proposition, but a ternary (at least) relation between agent, 
proposition, and some feature(s) of the agent’s situation.7  
Here are two hypotheses about how the situation-sensitive belief relation might 
figure in the semantics of belief ascriptions. First hypothesis: when we ascribe to S 
the belief that p, we diagonalize. That is, the implicit third argument place is filled by 
S’s situation. Second hypothesis: the implicit third argument place is filled in some 
other way, determined by the context of ascription. Sometimes S’s situation provides 
the missing parameter, but sometimes it comes from elsewhere. 
I think the second hypothesis is more plausible, no matter which sort of 
situation-sensitivity we posit. We ascribe belief for lots of reasons: sometimes I make 
claims about another’s beliefs because I want to predict how they will behave; 
sometimes because I care how they would answer a question my interlocutors are 
thinking about; sometimes because I want to ascribe group membership. These aims 
(and others unmentioned) can come apart: it’s not hard to imagine someone who says 
one thing—sincerely!—and does another. (In the next section, such cases will play a 
crucial role for Schwitzgebel’s contextualist view of belief; see the articles cited there 
for a plethora of examples.) 
In short, a situation-sensitive view of belief lends itself naturally to a contextualist 
view of belief ascriptions. This contrasts with the analogous view about knowledge: 
pragmatic encroachment on knowledge is usually set up as an alternative to 
k-contextualism. Why the difference? It might be that the “know”-analogue of the 
previous paragraph’s claims about belief ascriptions is less attractive: we might be 
happy to admit variation or flexibility in our reasons for ascribing belief, but think 
there is less variation in our reasons for ascribing knowledge. I won’t pursue that 
thought further here; but the parallel with pragmatic encroachment is worth exploring. 
7 Schwitzgebel’s Phenomenal, Dispositional 
Account 
Schwitzgebel (2002) defends a “phenomenal, dispositional account of belief”. The 
central notion for Schwitzgebel’s account is of a dispositional stereotype: for each 
proposition p, there is a cluster of dispositions we are apt to associate with belief that 
p. For example, the belief that there is beer in the fridge is associated with 
dispositions to open the fridge if someone asks for beer, to say “Yes” if asked 
whether there is beer in the fridge, to experience surprise if one sees no beer on 
looking in the fridge, and so on. None of these dispositions is a necessary condition 
for belief that there is beer in the fridge: if I am stingy, I won’t open the fridge when 
you ask for beer; if I am uncooperative, I won’t answer your questions; if I believe 
the beer is invisible, I won’t be surprised at seeing no beer in the fridge; but despite 
                                                          
7 This is not the only way of understanding situation sensitivity. Situation sensitivity 
might mean instead that belief is a binary relation between an agent and a 
proposition, but one whose holding or otherwise depends on some third situational 
factor. The “present purpose” I appeal to in the main text is: building a plausible 
case for b-contextualism based on situation sensitivity. For the argument sketched in 
the main text to succeed, it is true, this understanding of situation-sensitivity as 
ternarity would need to be defended; but for the present, I’ll settle for its being one 
plausible interpretation of the situation sensitive views surveyed above. Thanks to 
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa for pressing me on this point. 
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all this I might believe there is beer in the fridge. Nevertheless, typically, when one 
believes that there is beer in the fridge, one has these dispositions and others like 
them. 
According to Schwitzgebel, then, to believe that p “is nothing more than to match 
to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for 
believing that p” (Schwitzgebel 2002: 253, emphasis added). When we are happy to 
count a stingy and uncooperative agent as unequivocally believing there is (invisible) 
beer in the fridge, it is because they possess enough of the other stereotypical 
dispositions: e.g., dispositions to use the proposition that there is beer in the fridge as 
a premise in practical reasoning, to open the fridge when thirsty, and so on. 
The emphasized words in the quote above lead to Schwitzgebel’s contextualism. 
Different conversational purposes and assumptions can mean differences in both how 
closely an agent must match the stereotype to count as believing, and what sort of 
deviations from the stereotype are excusable. One and the same agent might match 
the stereotype closely enough and in the ways that count for one conversation, but not 
for another.  
Suppose, for example, that a child studying for a test reads, “The 
Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620,” and remembers this fact. 
She is a bit confused about what Pilgrims are, though: She is unsure 
whether they were religious refugees or warriors or American natives. 
Now does she believe that the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock in 
1620? She deviates from the stereotype in some respects: She will not 
conclude that Europeans landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620; and when 
she imagines the event, she may bring some inappropriate images to 
mind. In some contexts—e.g., if we are talking about her likely 
performance on a history dates quiz—we might be inclined to describe 
her as believing this fact about the Pilgrims; in other contexts we would 
not. (Schwitzgebel 2002: 257)  
Let us add: not only are we inclined to say different things about the child in different 
conversations, but our inclinations track the truth conditions of the things we might 
say. Thus, an utterance of “[the child] believes the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock 
in 1620” would be true in a conversation where her beliefs matter primarily as a 
matter of predicting her performance on a test; yet the same utterance would be false 
in a conversation where it is important whether she can make appropriate inferences 
from the Pilgrims’ landing. 
This example of the confused child is one of many Schwitzgebel offers in a series 
of papers (2001, 2002, 2010) under the heading “in-between believing”. On 
Schwitzgebel’s view, belief that p is a vague property: some agents definitely believe 
that p and some definitely lack belief that p, but others are in between believing and 
not believing. This is to be understood in terms of dispositional stereotypes: the clear 
cases are agents who robustly match (or robustly fail to match) the dispositional 
stereotype for belief that p; the in-between cases are agents who match the stereotype 
partially or incompletely. The in-between cases will generally leave us uncomfortable 
simply saying that the agent does or does not believe that p (as indeed it seems 
misleading simply to say without elaboration that the child described above believes 
the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620). However, conversational context can 
specify a subset of the stereotype, or a degree of matching, as relevant. In such 
conversations, we may be happy to attribute belief or lack thereof without further 
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elaboration; and we may utter apparently conflicting things about the same agent in 
different conversations. 
Schwitzgebel writes:  
This vagueness and context-dependency does not undermine the 
value of belief ascription, but rather makes it flexible and responsive to 
our needs as belief ascribers. Similar vagueness and context-dependency 
can be found in the ascription of character traits, providing them with a 
similar flexible utility. The numerous examples in this paper will, I hope, 
help to support the view that talk about belief can be vague and flexible 
in this way and still quite useful-more useful in fact than an approach 
that rigidly insists on determinate yes-or-no answers to all questions 
about what people believe. (Schwitzgebel 2002: 253) 
8 Truman 
I conclude by offering a story analogous with k-contextualists’ case pairs. For reasons 
of space, I won’t give an extensive discussion of it—if the Bank Cases teach us 
anything, it’s that millions of interpretations of such stories are possible. 
Nevertheless, I think it worth showing that something along the lines of the 
best-known argument for k-contextualism may also be available for b-contextualism.  
There’s a bird in the garden. Truman, an avid birder, is watching the 
bird from inside the house. He’s writing a list of the bird species he sees 
in the garden this morning. After a moment’s careful observation, he 
adds Western Wood-Pewee to his list. He then stands up and leaves for 
another part of the house, out of sight and out of earshot of the yard. All 
this is being recorded and broadcast live: Truman is on a reality TV 
show. Shortly after Truman leaves his view of the yard, the broadcast 
shows an exterior shot of the bird, who briefly sings; Truman does not 
hear it, as is clear to the show’s audience. 
Alima and Arthur are watching Truman on TV. They are fans of the 
show, and aspiring birders. They enjoy the show partly because they can 
learn about birds by watching Truman identify them. They see Truman 
as an authority on birds. Arthur is looking away when the cameras show 
Truman adding Western Wood-Pewee to his list, but he sees the bird. He 
asks Alima what kind of bird it is. Alima replies, “Truman thinks it’s a 
Western Wood-Pewee.” 
Elsewhere, Bart, Betty, and Begbie are also watching Truman’s 
show. They, too, are birders, and they are watching Truman’s show with 
their entire birding club. Unlike Alima and Arthur, Bart and Betty know 
that a Rare Bird Alert has recently been issued in the Los Angeles area, 
where Truman’s show is filmed, and where Bart and Betty live: an 
Eastern Wood-Pewee has recently been sighted in the area. Los Angeles 
is well outside the Eastern Wood-Pewee’s range. Here’s what Sibley 
(2003, p. 280) says about the Eastern Wood-Pewee, Contopus virens: 
“Essentially identical in habits and appearance to Western Wood-Pewee 
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[Contopus sordidulus], but range barely overlaps; reliably distinguished 
only by voice, most easily the song.”8 
When they see the bird sing on TV (after Truman has absconded), a 
dispute breaks out among the birding club about whether the bird in 
Truman’s yard was a Western or an Eastern Wood-Pewee. As a measure 
to ease tensions and resolve the dispute, Bart suggests polling the 
opinions of the assembled experts; Betty offers to record the votes. Since 
everyone present regards Truman as an authority on birds, Betty asks 
which camp Truman belongs to: should he be recorded as voting Eastern 
or Western? Begbie says, pointing at the TV screen, which now shows 
Truman’s list, “He thinks it’s a Western.”  
Bart responds, “No no, he doesn’t think it’s a Western. He wrote that 
it’s a Western Wood-Pewee, but he didn’t hear it sing. He hasn’t even 
thought about whether it’s a Western or an Eastern—he knows you can 
only tell the difference by listening. Don’t put him on either side.”  
Both Alima and Bart speak naturally and truthfully. It seems Alima is correct to 
attribute to Truman the belief that the bird is a Western Wood-Pewee, and it seems 
Bart is correct to deny the same belief of Truman. This needs to be explained. 
Contextualism about belief ascriptions allows a straightforward explanation: 
Alima and Bart seem to speak truly because they do. Despite the surface appearance 
of a contradiction, they do not, in fact, contradict one another. It is possible for 
Truman to “believe” the bird is a Western, in Alima’s sense, and also not “believe” 
the bird is a Western, in Bart’s sense. 
Note that the following type of response does not help the anti-contextualist. One 
might respond: “I wouldn’t say what Bart says. Rather than deny that Truman thinks 
it’s a Western, I would say something else—maybe that he thinks it’s a Western, but 
you shouldn’t include his vote because his belief isn’t reliable, or something like 
that.” But the contextualist needn’t argue that what Bart says is better than this 
alternative. What, I claim, needs to be explained is that what Alima and Bart each say 
is natural and acceptable; I do not claim that there are no other things, even in some 
sense better things, Bart might have said instead. 
An effective anti-contextualist response needs to address what Bart says, not what 
he could have said instead. As I said above, space prevents a full discussion of 
possible responses to the case. My aim in this brief section is just to sketch the 
beginning of a case-based argument for b-contextualism, analogous to the traditional 
case-pair-based argument for k-contextualism.9  
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